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We argue that vagueness is amulti-faceted phenomenon requiring a framework for concept
representation incorporating aspects of typicality, semantic uncertainty and indetermin-
ism. In this paper we propose a bipolar model for vague concepts within the framework
of prototype theory where concepts are represented by prototypical regions of an under-
lying conceptual space, and in which the appropriateness of a concept label to describe a
given instance is determined on the basis of both a lower and an upper threshold on the
distance from the defining prototype. Essentially, the label is absolutely appropriate as a de-
scription, providing that the distance to the prototype is less than the lower threshold, and
not absolutely inappropriate if it is less than the upper threshold. Hence, in effect a concept is
defined by lower and upper neighbourhoods of the prototype within the conceptual space,
and the borderline region between the neighbourhoods identifies those elements of the
space for which the concept label is neither absolutely appropriate nor absolutely inappro-
priate to describe. Semantic uncertainty is then represented by a joint probability density
function on the lower and upper thresholds so that the lower and upper neighbourhoods
correspond to nested random sets. This naturally results in lower and upper appropriate-
ness measures quantifying the belief that a concept label is absolutely appropriate and not
absolutely inappropriate to describe a given element of the space. These measures can then
be related to the random set interpretation of fuzzy sets and in particular to lower and upper
membership functions in interval fuzzy set theory.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
For vague concepts and categories it is inherently difficult, perhaps even impossible, to identify a precise boundary
between those cases included within the category and those which lie outside it. Indeed there are a number of different
aspects and interpretations of this phenomenon which have inspired a range of approaches to modelling and representing
vagueness (see Williamson [1] for an extensive overview). Here we will be focusing on an integrated approach combining
typicality, indeterminism and semantic uncertainty, by generalising the prototype and random set theory model of vague
concepts introduced in [2]. Prototype based models of concepts naturally generate an ordering on elements according to
which some aremore typical exemplars of a concept than others. Indeterminism refers to the idea that vague concepts admit
a borderline region of the underlying conceptual space in which the concept is neither absolutely applicable nor absolutely
inapplicable. Semantic uncertainty, on theother hands, refers to uncertainty about theprecise locationof concept boundaries
which results from the distributed and empirical manner in which individuals learn the definition of concepts through their
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communicationswith others. For example, consider the concept short defined on the set of heightsR+. Instead of identifying
a single threshold below which a height will be classified as tall, we might identify both a lower and upper threshold h ≤ h
such that a height is absolutely tall if it is less than h and absolutely not tall if it is greater than h. This leaves a borderline
region of heights between h and h, where for heights h in this region that statement ‘h is tall’ is indeterminate being neither
absolutely true nor absolutely false. Furthermore, an agent may be uncertain as to the precise value of the thresholds h and
h, andmay instead view them as randomvariableswith an associated probability density function. This implies an epistemic
view of semantic uncertainty, a case for which we will outline below.
The existence of borderline cases for vague conceptsmanifests itself in the bipolar nature of assertability. Taking the view
that concept definitions are to a large extent determined by linguistic conventions which identify their assertability given
a particular state of the world, it would appear that such conventions admit at least two distinct levels of assertability. For
example, Parikh [3] observes that:
Certain sentences are assertible in the sense that we might ourselves assert them and other cases of sentences which are
non-assertible in the sense that we ourselves (and many others) would reproach someone who used them. But there will
also be the intermediate kind of sentences, where we might allow their use.
Consider, for instance, awitness in a court of lawwho describes a suspect as being short. Nowdepending on the actual height
of the suspect this statement may be viewed as being clearly true or clearly false, in which latter case the witness could be
accused of perjury. However, therewill also be an intermediate range of heights for which it may be acceptable to assert both
the statement ‘the suspect is short’ and its negation even thoughneither statement is viewedas being absolutely true. Indeed,
this bipolarity of assertability would seem to be a special case of what Dubois and Prade [4] refer to as symmetric bivariate
unipolaritywhereby judgements are made according to two separate evaluations, i.e., in this case distinct evaluations about
the absolute truth and the absolute falsity of a statement. As is often the case with this type of bipolarity there is then a
natural duality between these two evaluations in which a statement is absolutely true if and only if its negation is absolutely
false.
As well as indeterminism, semantic uncertainty is another fundamentally important aspect of vagueness which in our
view is best understood in terms of a lack of knowledge about the underlying conventions of the language according to
which concepts are defined. Adopting this perspective means that we are effectively assuming that each agent believes in
the existence of a coherent set of rules governing how concepts and categories can be appropriately applied. In other words,
each agent believes that there is a correct interpretation of the predicates in the language, even though theymay be uncertain
as to the precise nature of this underlying semantics. From this it would seem that our position is close to the epistemic view
of vagueness as expounded by Williamson [1], and according to which there is a precise but unknown boundary between
the extension of a concept and that of its negation. However, while there are similarities between our view and the epistemic
theory of vagueness there are also some subtle but important differences. For instance, the epistemic theory assumes that
the underlying interpretation of the language is boolean, while here we aim to provide a model which integrates semantic
uncertainty with the explicit representation of borderline cases. Furthermore, the epistemic theory seems to assume the
actual existence of some objectively correct interpretation of the language which is not necessarily correlated with language
use. Insteadweadopt themorepragmatic position, that individuals,when facedwithdecisions aboutwhat to assert in a given
context, find it useful as part of an overall decision making strategy to simply assume that there is a correct interpretation
of the description labels in the language. In other words, in their decision making about what is appropriate to assert when,
agents behave as if the epistemic theory of vagueness is correct. In [5] we refer to this strategic assumption on the part of
individuals across a population of communicating agents as the epistemic stance, a concise statement of which is as follows:
Each individual agent in the population assumes the existence of a correct set of language conventions, governing what
can appropriately (or truthfully) be asserted given a particular state of the world.
From this perspective, we see linguistic conventions as a distributed, noisy and incomplete body of semantic knowledge,
shared across a population of agents, and emerging as the result of interactions and communications between individual
agents all adopting the epistemic stance. Given this we would certainly expect agents to have significant uncertainty about
how to appropriately use concept labels across a range of instances.
2. Combining prototype theory and random set theory
Prototype theory has been proposed by Rosch [6,7] as an alternative model of concepts in natural language. The funda-
mental idea is that concepts, instead of being defined by formal rules or mappings, are represented by a set of prototypical
cases. These cases correspond to those elements of the conceptual space  [8], which it is certain satisfy the concept. Cat-
egorization of elements from  is then based on similarity to the prototypes as quantified by a distance metric defined
on  (see [9] for an overview). By taking typicality to be a decreasing function of distance from prototypes, this approach
would naturally explain the fact that some instances are seen as being more typical exemplars of a concept than others. For
instance, robins are viewed as being a more typical example of the concept bird than penguins, since the latter have certain
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atypical characteristics such as the inability to fly. This notion of typicality is also strongly related to concept vaguenesswhere
borderline cases have an intermediate range of typicality values. In other words, such cases are not sufficiently similar to
the prototypes to be judged as having certain membership in the category but are also not sufficiently dissimilar to the
prototypes to be ruled out as being certainly outside the category.
Random set theory has been proposed by Goodman and Nguyen as a framework for linguistic reasoning in rule based
systems [10–12]. Stated simply, random sets are set-valued variables with an associated probability measure. In Goodman
and Nguyen’s work they provide a model of vague concepts from the perspective that the extension of such a concept is an
uncertain set. This is an implicitly epistemicmodel of vagueness since by using a randomset tomodel a concept an intelligent
agent is assuming that there is a correct extension set about which they are uncertain. However, as we have argued above,
this does not require that there actually is some objectively correct definition of the concept (as suggested by Williamson
[1]), but rather that agents adopt the epistemic stance.
Dubois et al. [13] have identified both random sets and prototype theory as possible interpretations of fuzzy set member-
ship functions. More specifically, given a random setRmodelling a concept, the fuzzy set membership value of an element
x in R is then taken to be the probability that the value of R is a set which contains x. This is the single point coverage
function of the random set R. For the prototype theory model it is assumed that there exists a similarity measure between
the elements of , which takes values in [0, 1]. Given a set of prototypical elements, the membership of x in the associated
fuzzy set is then taken as corresponding to the similarity between x and these prototypes [14]. In [2] we have proposed a
natural combination of prototype theory and random set theory tomodel linguistic labels and descriptions. The idea behind
this approach is that, in order to decidewhether the assertion ‘x is Li’ is appropriate for element x and label Li with prototypes
Pi, an agent would threshold the distance between x and Pi. In other words, Li would be deemed an appropriate label for
x provided that d(x, Pi) ≤ , for some distance function d : 2 → [0,∞) and threshold  ≥ 0. However, the inherent
semantic uncertainty about Li would naturally result in uncertainty about the value of threshold . Consequently, the exten-
sion of Li would correspond to a random set neighbourhood of the prototypes of Li as defined by those elements which lie
within the uncertain threshold  of Pi. In the sequel we extend this idea, so as to generate lower and upper neighbourhoods
as extensions of a concept by introducing lower and upper thresholds.
An outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 3 proposes a random set theory model within the context
of prototype theory, introducing lower and upper neighbourhoods for concept labels from which can be inferred lower and
upper appropriateness measures. Section 4 gives a mass function characterization of these measures and Section 5 relates
this bipolar model to Kleene’s strong three valued logic. In Section 6 we explore the relationship between lower and upper
appropriateness measures and lower and upper membership functions in interval fuzzy set theory. Furthermore, this also
links appropriateness measures to intuitionistic fuzzy sets, since the latter are isomorphic to interval fuzzy sets. Finally
Section 7 gives some conclusions and indicates possible directions for future work.
3. Lower and upper appropriateness measures
Let  denote the underlying conceptual space [8] and LA = {L1, . . . , Ln} be a finite set of linguistic labels for describing
elements of . In addition, we assume a pseudo-distance metric d : 2 → R+ is defined such that ∀x, y ∈ , d(x, x) = 0
and d(x, y) = d(y, x). This metric is extended to sets of values so that for S, T ⊆ , d(S, T) = inf{d(x, y) : x ∈ S, y ∈ T}.
For each label Li there is a set of prototypical elements Pi ⊆ , such that for element x ∈ , the appropriateness of Li
to describe x is judged on the basis of the distance d(x, Pi) between x and the prototypes Pi. More specifically, we assume
that there are lower and upper distance threshold  ≤ , such that Li is absolutely appropriate to describe x if d(x, Pi) ≤ ,
and Li is absolutely inappropriate to describe x if d(x, Pi) > . Hence, we are explicitly identifying a borderline region where
 < d(x, Pi) ≤ , in which Li is neither absolutely appropriate nor absolutely inappropriate to describe x. In this context
we can think of the extension of the underlying concept or category labeled Li as corresponding to an inner and outer
neighbourhood as follows:
Definition 1 (Lower and upper neighborhoods for labels). For any  ≥  ≥ 0 the (, )-lower and upper neighborhoods
N (,)Li and N
(,)
Li
are respectively defined as follows:
N (,)Li = {x : d(x, Pi) ≤ }
N (,)Li = {x : d(x, Pi) ≤ }
Clearly, the underlying intuition behind Definition 1 is that N (,)Li corresponds to those elements of  for which Li is an
absolutely appropriate label, whileN (,)Li is those elements for which Li is not an absolutely inappropriate label. In essence,
the definition of lower and upper neighborhoods is a kind of extension of the similarity based framework to model vague
concepts, such as [15–19].
We now extend this bipolar representational model to compound label expressions in the following manner.
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Definition 2 (Label expressions). The set of label expressions, LE, is defined recursively as follows:
1. LA ⊆ LE;
2. If θ ∈ LE, ϕ ∈ LE, then θ ∧ ϕ ∈ LE, θ ∨ ϕ ∈ LE,¬θ ∈ LE.
In this definition θ ∧ ϕ means ‘θ and ϕ’, θ ∨ ϕ means ‘θ or ϕ’, and ¬θ means ‘not θ ’. Actually LE denotes the set of
sentences of a language of propositional logic with connective∧,∨ and¬ and a finite set of propositional variables LA. For
example, if  is the set of all possible rgb values then LA could consist of the basic colour labels such as red, yellow, green,
orange etc. In this case LE then contains those compound expression such as red & yellow, not blue nor orange etc.
Definition 3 (Lower and upper neighborhoods for label expressions). The lower and upper neighborhoods for label expressions
in LE are defined recursively as follows: For 0 ≤  ≤ , Li ∈ LA and θ, ϕ ∈ LE we define,
• N (,)Li = {x ∈  : d(x, Pi) ≤ } and N (,)Li = {x ∈  : d(x, Pi) ≤ }
• N (,)θ∧ϕ = N (,)θ ∩ N (,)ϕ and N (,)θ∧ϕ = N (,)θ ∩ N (,)ϕ
• N (,)θ∨ϕ = N (,)θ ∪ N (,)ϕ and N (,)θ∨ϕ = N (,)θ ∪ N (,)ϕ
• N (,)¬θ = (N (,)θ )c and N (,)¬θ = (N (,)θ )c
Hence, according to Definition 3, a label expression θ is absolutely appropriate to describe x if and only if x ∈ N (,)θ , while
θ is not absolutely inappropriate to describe x if and only if x ∈ N (,)θ . The treatment of negation in Definition 3 is motivated
by the intuition that ¬θ is absolutely appropriate to describe an element x if and only if θ is absolutely inappropriate to
describe x. The following result shows that Definition 3 is consistent with N (,)θ and N
(,)
θ being lower and upper sets,
respectively for any sentence in LE.
Theorem 1. For any θ ∈ LE and  ≥  ≥ 0 it holds that, N (,)θ ⊆ N (,)θ .
Proof. Let LE1 = LA and LEm = LEm−1 ∪ {φ ∧ ϕ, φ ∨ ϕ,¬φ : φ, ϕ ∈ LEm−1}, then LE = ∪∞m=1LEm. We now carry out
induction onm. If θ = Li then it holds sinceN (,)Li = {x : d(x, Pi) ≤ } ⊆ {x : d(x, Pi) ≤ } = N (,)Li . Assume that for any
θ ∈ LEm it holds, then for any θ ∈ LEm+1 either θ ∈ LEm, in which case the result holds trivially, or θ ∈ {φ ∧ϕ, φ ∨ϕ,¬φ :
φ, ϕ ∈ LEm} for which one of the following holds:
1. For θ = φ ∧ ϕ where φ, ϕ ∈ LEm then N (,)θ = N (,)φ∧ϕ = N (,)φ ∩ N (,)ϕ ⊆ N (,)φ ∩ N (,)ϕ = N (,)φ∧ϕ = N (,)θ .
2. For θ = φ ∨ ϕ where φ, ϕ ∈ LEm then N (,)θ = N (,)φ∨ϕ = N (,)φ ∪ N (,)ϕ ⊆ N (,)φ ∪ N (,)ϕ = N (,)φ∨ϕ = N (,)θ .
3. For θ = ¬φ where φ ∈ LEm then N (,)θ = N (,)¬φ =
(
N (,)φ
)c ⊆ (N (,)φ
)c = N (,)¬φ = N (,)θ . 
Corollary 1. ∀θ ∈ LE and 0 ≤  ≤  it holds that:
N (,)θ∧¬θ = ∅ and N (,)θ∨¬θ = 
Proof. For any θ ∈ LE, N (,)θ∧¬θ = N (,)θ ∩ N (,)¬θ = N (,)θ ∩ (N (,)θ )c = ∅ since N (,)θ ⊆ N (,)θ according to Theorem
1. And N (,)θ∨¬θ = N (,)θ ∪ N (,)¬θ = (N (,)¬θ )c ∪ (N (,)θ )c = (N (,)¬θ ∩ N (,)θ )c = (N (,)θ∧¬θ )c = . 
Theorem 2. For any φ, ϕ ∈ LE, and any  ≥  ≥ 0, the following hold:
• N (,)¬(¬φ) = N (,)φ and N (,)¬(¬φ) = N (,)φ .
• N (,)¬(φ∧ϕ) = N (,)¬φ∨¬ϕ and N (,)¬(φ∧ϕ) = N (,)¬φ∨¬ϕ .
• N (,)¬(φ∨ϕ) = N (,)¬φ∧¬ϕ and N (,)¬(φ∨ϕ) = N (,)¬φ∧¬ϕ .
Proof. For any φ, ϕ ∈ LE, and any  ≥  ≥ 0, we have
• N (,)¬(¬φ) =
(
N (,)¬φ
)c =
((
N (,)φ
)c)c = N (,)φ . Similarly N (,)¬(¬φ) =
(
N (,)¬φ
)c =
((
N (,)φ
)c)c = N (,)φ .
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• N (,)¬(φ∧ϕ) =
(
N (,)φ∧ϕ
)c = (N (,)φ ∩ N (,)ϕ
)c = (N (,)φ
)c ∪ (N (,)ϕ
)c = N (,)¬φ ∪ N (,)¬ϕ = N (,)¬φ∨¬ϕ . Similarly
N (,)¬(φ∧ϕ) =
(
N (,)φ∧ϕ
)c = (N (,)φ ∩ N (,)ϕ
)c = (N (,)φ
)c ∪ (N (,)ϕ
)c = N (,)¬φ ∪ N (,)¬ϕ = N (,)¬φ∨¬ϕ .
• N (,)¬(φ∨ϕ) =
(
N (,)φ∨ϕ
)c = (N (,)φ ∪ N (,)ϕ
)c = (N (,)φ
)c ∩ (N (,)ϕ
)c = N (,)¬φ ∩ N (,)¬ϕ = N (,)¬φ∧¬ϕ . Similarly
N (,)¬(φ∨ϕ) =
(
N (,)φ∨ϕ
)c = (N (,)φ ∪ N (,)ϕ
)c = (N (,)φ
)c ∩ (N (,)ϕ
)c = N (,)¬φ ∩ N (,)¬ϕ = N (,)¬φ∧¬ϕ . 
Wenow propose to capture semantic uncertainty about the definition of the labels LA, by a probability density function δ
on the lower and upper distance thresholds (, ), defined on the set of possible thresholdsT = {(, ) ∈ (R+)2 :  ≤ }.
This naturally leads to the following definition of lower and upper appropriateness measures of an expression θ for an
element x, as corresponding to the probabilities that the lower and upper distance threshold values are such that x ∈ N (,)θ
and x ∈ N (,)θ , respectively.
Definition 4 (Lower and upper appropriateness measures). ∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈  the lower and upper appropriateness measures,
μ
θ
(x) and μθ(x), are defined respectively as follows:
μ
θ
(x) = δ
({
(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N (,)θ
})
μθ(x) = δ
({
(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N (,)θ
})
Corollary 2. ∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈ , it holds that μ
θ
(x) ≤ μθ(x).
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 1. 
Example 1. Let  = R, d(x, y) = ‖x − y‖ and Li be a label with prototype Pi = {6}. Here we suppose that the lower
and upper thresholds  ≤  are generated from two independently distributed thresholds 1 ∼ δ1 and 2 ∼ δ2 where
δ1(1) =
√
2√
πσ1
e
− 21
2σ21 and δ2(2) =
√
2√
πσ2
e
− 22
2σ22 . Effectively, δ1 and δ2 are normal distributions which have been renor-
malised to havemodal value 0, and to be defined only onR+. Here, we consider two approaches. In the first case take  = 1
and  = 1 + 2. This results in a joint density function on (, ) given by:
δ(, ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2
πσ1σ2
e
− 2
2σ21
− (−)2
2σ22 :  ≤ 
0 : otherwise
The resulting lower and upper appropriateness measure for Li, where σ1 = 0.8 and σ2 = 1.8, are then shown in figure 1
(a) as x varies. A second possibility for defining lower and upper thresholds is to take  = min(1, 2) and  = max(1, 2).
In this case the joint density function on (, ) given by:
δ(, ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
2
πσ1σ2
⎡
⎣e−
2
2σ21
− 2
2σ22 + e−
2
2σ21
− 2
2σ22
⎤
⎦ :  ≤ 
0 : otherwise
Fig. 1 (b) shows the lower and upper appropriateness measures in this case, again with σ1 = 0.8 and σ2 = 1.8.
Actually for any label expression θ the lower neighborhoodN (,)θ and upper neighborhoodN
(,)
φ are random sets taking
values as subsets of, andμ
θ
andμθ are the single point coverage functions ofN
(,)
θ andN
(,)
θ , respectively. Hence, from
the perspective of the random set interpretation of fuzzy set membership functions proposed in [10–13] μ
θ
(x) and μθ(x)
can be considered as membership values of x in the lower and upper extensions of θ , respectively. In other words, the
membership value of x in the extension of θ is an interval value [μ
θ
(x), μθ (x)].
Clearly the bipolar model for label expressions is a structured model where the semantics is quantified by a random pair
of lower and upper distance thresholds with a joint probability density function. In particular, all labels Li in LA is modelled
by a triple 〈Pi, d, δ〉where Pi is the set of prototypes for Li, d is a pseudo-distance on, and δ is a probability density function
on T = {(, ) :  ≤ }. In [20] a similar structure with the triple 〈Pi, d, δ〉 referred as the bipolar semantic cell is also
proposed for label Li. However, in [20] the density function δ is defined on (R
+)2 and the lower and upper neighborhoods
for Li are defined as N (1,2)Li = {x : d(x, Pi) ≤ min(1, 2)} and N (1,2)Li = {x : d(x, Pi) ≤ max(1, 2)} given a pair of
distance thresholds (1, 2) ∈ (R+)2. Obviously the bipolar semantic cell model introduced in [20] is a special case of our
current model if we let  = min(1, 2) and  = max(1, 2), and the density δ(, ) = δ(1, 2) (see an illustration in
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Lower and upper appropriateness measure where  and  are generated from two independent thresholds 1 and 2. (a) shows the appropriateness
measures if  = 1 and  = 1 + 2. (b) shows the appropriateness measures if  = min(1, 2) and  = max(1, 2).
Example 1). Hence, the triple 〈Pi, d, δ〉 for label Li proposed in this paper is also referred as bipolar semantic cell for Li. We
will further discuss the properties of bipolar model for label expressions in this section, the mass function characterization
of this bipolar model in Section 4 and explore the relationships with the Kleene’s three-valued logic and the intuitionistic
fuzzy sets in Sections 5 and 6.
Theorem 3. ∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈ , μ¬θ (x) = 1 − μθ(x) and μ¬θ (x) = 1 − μθ(x).
Proof. For any θ ∈ LE and x ∈  the following hold:
μ¬θ (x) = δ
({
(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N (,)¬θ
})
= δ
({
(, ) ∈ T : x ∈
(
N (,)θ
)c})
= 1 − δ
({
(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N (,)θ
})
= 1 − μθ(x)
Similarly,
μ¬θ (x) = δ
({
(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N (,)¬θ
})
= δ
({
(, ) ∈ T : x ∈
(
N (,)θ
)c})
= 1 − δ
({
(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N (,)θ
})
= 1 − μ
θ
(x). 
Corollary 3. ∀φ, ϕ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈  the following hold:
• μ¬(¬φ)(x) = μφ(x) and μ¬(¬φ)(x) = μφ(x).• μ¬(φ∧ϕ))(x) = μ¬φ∨¬ϕ(x) and μ¬(φ∧ϕ))(x) = μ¬φ∨¬ϕ(x).• μ¬(φ∨ϕ))(x) = μ¬φ∧¬ϕ(x) and μ¬(φ∨ϕ))(x) = μ¬φ∧¬ϕ(x).
Proof. Follows immediately from Definition 4 and Theorem 2. 
Corollary 4. ∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈ , μ
θ∧¬θ (x) = 0 and μθ∨¬θ (x) = 1.
Proof. Follows immediately from Definition 4 and Corollary 1. 
Corollary 4 shows that for any element x ∈  and for any expression θ ∈ LE the label expression θ ∧¬θ is certainly ab-
solutely inappropriate to describe any element x, whilst the label expression θ ∨¬θ is certainly not absolutely inappropriate
to describe x. In other words, the lower appropriateness measure does satisfy the law of non-contradiction whilst the upper
appropriateness measure does satisfy the law of excluded middle. However, in general μθ∧¬θ (x) > 0 and μθ∨¬θ (x) < 1
as we shall see in the sequel. Initially, however, we show that lower and upper appropriateness measures are additive.
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Theorem 4. ∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈  we have that:
μ
φ∨ϕ(x) = μφ(x) + μϕ(x) − μφ∧ϕ(x)
μφ∨ϕ(x) = μφ(x) + μϕ(x) − μφ∧ϕ(x)
Proof. ∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈  it holds that
μ
φ∨ϕ(x) = δ({(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N
(,)
φ∨ϕ }) = δ({(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N (,)φ ∪ N (,)ϕ })
= δ({(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N (,)φ }) + δ({(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N (,)ϕ })
−δ({(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N (,)φ ∩ N (,)ϕ }) = μφ(x) + μϕ(x) − μφ∧ϕ(x)
The result for μφ∨ϕ(x) follows similarly. 
Corollary 5. ∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈  we have the following:
μ
θ∨¬θ (x) = μθ(x) + μ¬θ (x) and μθ∧¬θ (x) = μθ(x) − μθ(x)
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 4 and corollary 4. 
Definition 5. We define I : LE ×  → 2T and I : LE ×  → 2T such that ∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈ :
I(θ, x) = {(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N (,)θ } and
I(θ, x) = {(, ) ∈ T : x ∈ N (,)θ }
Given this definition clearly we have that ∀x ∈ , ∀θ ∈ LE, μ
θ
(x) = δ(I(θ, x)) and μθ(x) = δ(I(θ, x)).
Lemma 1. ∀θ, ϕ ∈ LE, ∀Li ∈ LA and ∀x ∈  we have the following:
• I(Li, x) = {(, ) ∈ T :  ≥ d(x, Pi)}
and I(Li, x) = {(, ) ∈ T :  ≥ d(x, Pi)}.• I(θ ∧ ϕ, x) = I(θ, x) ∩ I(ϕ, x) and I(θ ∧ ϕ, x) = I(θ, x) ∩ I(ϕ, x).
• I(θ ∨ ϕ, x) = I(θ, x) ∪ I(ϕ, x) and I(θ ∨ ϕ, x) = I(θ, x) ∪ I(ϕ, x).
• I(¬θ, x) = (I(θ, x))c and I(¬θ, x) = (I(θ, x))c .
Proof. Follows immediately from Definitions 5 and 3. 
Example 2. As in Example 1 let  = R and d(x, y) = ‖x − y‖. Also let Li and Lj be labels with prototypes Pi = {6} and
Pj = {9}. Now by Definition 5 we have that:
I(Li ∧ ¬Lj, x) = {(, ) ∈ T : d(x, Pi) ≤ , d(x, Pj) > }
= {(, ) ∈ T :  ≥ ‖x − 6‖ ,  < ‖x − 9‖}
I(Li ∧ ¬Lj, x) = {(, ) ∈ T : d(x, Pi) ≤ , d(x, Pj) > }
= {(, ) ∈ T :  < ‖x − 9‖ ,  ≥ ‖x − 6‖}
Hence, lower and upper appropriateness measures are given by:
μ
Li∧¬Lj(x) =
∫ ∞
‖x−6‖
∫ ‖x−9‖
min(,‖x−9‖)
δ(, )dd and
μLi∧¬Lj(x) =
∫ ‖x−9‖
0
∫ ∞
max(,‖x−6‖)
δ(, )dd
Fig. 2 shows the lower and upper measures for Li ∧ ¬Lj for the model where  = 1 and  = 1 + 2 outlined in Example
1, and where σ1 = 0.8 and σ2 = 1.8.
Let LE∧,∨ ⊂ LE be the set of label expressions generated by applying only the connectives∧ and∨ to linguistic labels in
LA.
Definition 6. Let lb : LE∧,∨ ×  → R+ be defined recursively as follows: ∀x ∈ , ∀θ, ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨, ∀Li ∈ LA,
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Fig. 2. Lower and upper appropriateness measures for Li ∧ ¬Lj .
• lb(Li, x) = d(x, Pi).• lb(θ ∧ ϕ, x) = max(lb(θ, x), lb(ϕ, x)).
• lb(θ ∨ ϕ, x) = min(lb(θ, x), lb(ϕ, x)).
Theorem 5. ∀x ∈ , ∀θ ∈ LE∧,∨ we have that:
I(θ, x) = {(, ) ∈ T : lb(θ, x) ≤ } and I(θ, x) = {(, ) ∈ T : lb(θ, x) ≤ }
Proof. Let LE
∧,∨
0 = LA, LE∧,∨m+1 = LE∧,∨m ∪ {φ ∧ ϕ, φ ∨ ϕ : φ, ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨m } for m > 0, then LE∧,∨ = ∪+∞m=0LE∧,∨m . We now
carry out the induction onm. If θ = Li then the results hold immediately. Assume that θ ∈ LE∧,∨m the results hold. Then for
any θ ∈ LE∧,∨m+1 either θ ∈ LE∧,∨m , for which case the results hold trivially, or θ ∈ {φ ∧ ϕ, φ ∨ ϕ : φ, ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨m } for which
one of the following holds:
1. If θ = φ ∧ ϕ where φ, ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨m then I(θ, x) = I(φ ∧ ϕ, x) = I(φ, x) ∩ I(ϕ, x) = {(, ) ∈ T : lb(φ, x) ≤
} ∩ {(, ) ∈ T : lb(ϕ, x) ≤ } = {(, ) ∈ T : max{lb(φ, x), lb(ϕ, x)} ≤ } = {(, ) ∈ T : lb(θ, x) ≤ }.
Similarly, I(θ, x) = I(φ ∧ ϕ, x) = I(φ, x) ∩ I(ϕ, x) = {(, ) ∈ T : lb(φ, x) ≤ } ∩ {(, ) ∈ T : lb(ϕ, x) ≤ } =
{(, ) ∈ T : max{lb(φ, x), lb(ϕ, x)} ≤ } = {(, ) ∈ T : lb(θ, x) ≤ }.
2. If θ = φ ∨ ϕ where φ, ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨m then I(θ, x) = I(φ ∨ ϕ, x) = I(φ, x) ∪ I(ϕ, x) = {(, ) ∈ T : lb(φ, x) ≤
} ∪ {(, ) ∈ T : lb(ϕ, x) ≤ } = {(, ) ∈ T : min{lb(φ, x), lb(ϕ, x)} ≤ } = {(, ) ∈ T : lb(θ, x) ≤ }.
Similarly, I(θ, x) = I(φ ∨ ϕ, x) = I(φ, x) ∪ I(ϕ, x) = {(, ) ∈ T : lb(φ, x) ≤ } ∪ {(, ) ∈ T : lb(ϕ, x) ≤ } =
{(, ) ∈ T : min{lb(φ, x), lb(ϕ, x)} ≤ } = {(, ) ∈ T : lb(θ, x) ≤ }. 
Corollary 6. ∀x ∈ , ∀θ, ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨ the following holds:
• μ
θ∧ϕ(x) = min(μθ (x), μϕ(x)) and μθ∧ϕ(x) = min(μθ (x), μϕ(x))• μ
θ∨ϕ(x) = max(μθ (x), μϕ(x)) and μθ∨ϕ(x) = max(μθ (x), μϕ(x))
Proof.
• If θ = φ ∧ ϕ where φ, ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨ then μ
θ
(x) = δ(I(θ, x)) = δ({(, ) ∈ T : lb(θ, x) ≤ }) = δ({(, ) ∈
T : max{lb(φ, x), lb(ϕ, x)} ≤ }) = min{δ({(, ) ∈ T : lb(φ, x) ≤ }), δ({(, ) ∈ T : lb(ϕ, x) ≤ })} =
min(μ
φ
(x), μ
ϕ
(x)). Similarly, μθ(x) = δ(I(θ, x)) = δ({(, ) ∈ T : lb(θ, x) ≤ }) = δ({(, ) ∈ T : max{lb(φ, x),
lb(ϕ, x)} ≤ }) = min{δ({(, ) ∈ T : lb(φ, x) ≤ }), δ({(, ) ∈ T : lb(ϕ, x) ≤ })} = min(μφ(x), μϕ(x)).• If θ = φ ∨ ϕ where φ, ϕ ∈ LE∧,∨ then μ
θ
(x) = δ(I(θ, x)) = δ({(, ) ∈ T : lb(θ, x) ≤ }) = δ({(, ) ∈
T : min{lb(φ, x), lb(ϕ, x)} ≤ }) = max{δ({(, ) ∈ T : lb(φ, x) ≤ }), δ({(, ) ∈ T : lb(ϕ, x) ≤ })} =
max(μ
φ
(x), μ
ϕ
(x)). Similarly, μθ(x) = δ(I(θ, x)) = δ({(, ) ∈ T : lb(θ, x) ≤ }) = δ({(, ) ∈ T :
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min{lb(φ, x), lb(ϕ, x)} ≤ }) = max{δ({(, ) ∈ T : lb(φ, x) ≤ }), δ({(, ) ∈ T : lb(ϕ, x) ≤ })} =
max(μφ(x), μϕ(x)). 
4. Mass function characterization
Given the prototype model of concepts described above we can also provide an alternative characterization of lower
and upper appropriateness measures by focusing on those sets of labels (i.e., subsets of LA) which are either absolutely
appropriate or at least not absolutely inappropriate to describe a given element x ∈ . This approach naturally results in a
lower and an upper set of labels for each x ∈  as follows:
Definition 7 ((, )-Lower and upper appropriate label sets). For any x ∈  and  ≥  ≥ 0 the (, )-lower appropriate
label set D(,)x and (, )-upper appropriate label set D(,)x are defined, respectively as follows:
D(,)x = {Li ∈ LA : d(x, Pi) ≤ } and D(,)x = {Li ∈ LA : d(x, Pi) ≤ }
The intuition behind Definition 7 is that D(,)x corresponds to the labels which are absolutely appropriate to describe
the element x and D(,)x corresponds to the labels which are not absolutely inappropriate to describe the element x. Since
the distance threshold pair (, ) is a random variable with a density function δ, we can also define a mass functionmx on
2LA × 2LA to capture the semantic uncertainty associated with the vague concepts in LA:
Definition 8. For x ∈  the mass functionmx : 2LA × 2LA → [0, 1] is defined as follows: For S, T ⊆ LA
mx(S, T) = δ({(, ) ∈ T : D(,)x = S,D(,)x = T})
Notice that for any x ∈  and (, ) ∈ Twe have D(,)x ⊆ D(,)x . Hence,mx(S, T) > 0 only if S ⊆ T ⊆ LA.
In the following we will show thatμ
θ
(x) andμθ(x) can be represented as the sums of certain mass values. In particular,
for any θ ∈ LE, we define λ(θ) such that μ
θ
(x) and μθ(x) can be calculated from the mass values across λ(θ).
Definition 9. The mapping λ : LE → 22LA×2LA , is defined recursively as follows: For Li ∈ LA, θ, ϕ ∈ LE,
• λ(Li) = {(S, T) : Li ∈ S}• λ(θ ∧ ϕ) = λ(θ) ∩ λ(ϕ)
• λ(θ ∨ ϕ) = λ(θ) ∪ λ(ϕ)
• λ(¬θ) = {(S, T) : (T, S) ∈ λ(θ)c}
The definition of λ-mapping in Definition 9 is motivated by the similar definition of λ-mapping given in [21,22].
Example 3. Let θ = Li ∧ ¬Lj . From Definition 9 we have that λ(Li) = {(S, T) : Li ∈ S} and λ(¬Lj) = {(S, T) : (T, S) ∈
λ(Lj)
c} = {(S, T) : Lj ∈ T}. Furthermore, λ(Li ∧ ¬Lj) = λ(Li) ∩ λ(¬Lj) = {(S, T) : Li ∈ S, Lj ∈ T}.
Theorem 6. ∀x ∈ , ∀θ ∈ LE, x ∈ N (,)θ iff (D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(θ), and x ∈ N (,)θ iff (D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(¬θ) iff
(D(,)x ,D
(,)
x ) ∈ λ(θ).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of label expressions: If θ=Li ∈ LA, then x ∈ N (,)Li iff (by Definition 3)
d(x, Pi) ≤  iff (D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(Li) (by Definitions 7 and 9). Similarly, x ∈ N (,)Li iff (by Definition 3) d(x, Pi) ≤  iff
(D(,)x ,D
(,)
x ) ∈ λ(Li) as required. Now assume the result holds for θ ∈ LEm. Then for θ ∈ LEm+1, either θ ∈ LEm in which
case the result follows trivially or ∃ψ, ϕ ∈ LEm such that one of the following holds:
• θ = ψ ∧ ϕ: In this case x ∈ N (,)ψ∧ϕ iff x ∈ N (,)ψ and x ∈ N (,)ϕ (by Definition 3) iff (D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(ψ) and
(D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(ϕ) (by induction) iff (D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(ψ ∧ ϕ) (by Definition 9). The result for N (,)ψ∧ϕ follows
similarly.
• θ = ψ ∨ ϕ: In this case x ∈ N (,)ψ∨ϕ iff x ∈ N (,)ψ or x ∈ N (,)ϕ (by Definition 3) iff (D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(ψ) or
(D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(ϕ) (by induction) iff (D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(ψ ∨ ϕ) (by Definition 9). The result for N (,)ψ∨ϕ follows
similarly.
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• θ = ¬ψ : In this case x ∈ N (,)¬ψ iff x ∈ (N (,)ψ )c (by Definition 3) iff (D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(ψ) (by induction) iff
(D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(¬ψ) (by Definition 9) as required. Similarly, x ∈ N (,)¬ψ iff x ∈ (N (,)ψ )c (by Definition 3) iff
(D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(ψ) (by induction) iff (D(,)x ,D(,)x ) ∈ λ(¬ψ) (by Definition 9) as required. 
Corollary 7. ∀x ∈ , ∀θ ∈ LE the following holds:
μ
θ
(x) = ∑
(S,T)∈λ(θ):S⊆T
mx(S, T)
μθ (x) =
∑
(S,T)∈λ(θ):T⊆S
mx(T, S)
Proof. Trivially from Definition 4 and Theorem 6. 
Theorem 7. For x ∈  assume w.l.o.g that d(x, P1) ≤ d(x, P2) ≤ · · · ≤ d(x, Pn) and let Si = {L1, . . . , Li} for i = 1, . . . , n
and S0 = ∅. Then for any i and j such that 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n the following holds:
mx(Si, Sj) =
⎧⎨
⎩
∫ d(x,Pi+1)
d(x,Pi)
∫ d(x,Pj+1)
d(x,Pj)
δ(, )dd d(x, Pj) > d(x, Pi)∫ d(x,Pi+1)
d(x,Pi)
∫ d(x,Pi+1)
 δ(, )dd d(x, Pj) = d(x, Pi)
where, for notational convenience, we take d(x, P0)  0 and d(x, Pn+1)  +∞. Furthermore, the following holds:∑
i≤j
mx(Si, Sj) = 1.
Proof. For any i and j such that 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n the following holds:
mx(Si, Sj) = δ({(, ) ∈ T : D(,)x = Si,D(,)x = Sj})
= δ({(, ) ∈ T : d(x, Pi) ≤  < d(x, Pi+1), d(x, Pj) ≤  < d(x, Pj+1)})
The result then follows immediately. 
Themass function characterization of lower and upper appropriatenessmeasures allows us to clearly identify the amount
of information required (i.e., the numerical values which must be specified) to completely define these two measures on
LE. From theorem 7 we see that μ and μ can be uniquely defined by specifyingm(Si, Sj) on
n2+3n+2
2
pairs (Si, Sj) and Si for
i = 0, . . . , n are the nested subsets. Hence the interval value [μ(x), μ(x)] is determined completely by the following mass
matrix:⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
m00 m01 · · · m0n
0 m11 · · · m1n
...
... · · · ...
0 0 · · · mnn
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
wheremij = mx(Si, Sj).
5. Relationship with Kleene’s three valued logic
In this sectionwe explore the relationship between the bipolar frameworkwe have introduced above and Kleene’s strong
three-valued logic. In effect we shall show that for x ∈  the lower and upper appropriateness measures across the label
expressions can be determined from a probability distribution on valuations in Kleene’s logic.
Definition 10. A Kleene valuation is a function v : LE → {t, b, f } defined recursively from an allocation to the labels in LA
by application of the Kleene truth-tables as given in Table 1.
Intuitively, given a particular element x ∈ , we can think of a Kleene valuation as allocating one of three-truth values to
the statement ‘x is θ ’ for expression θ ∈ LE: v(θ) = t means that ‘x is θ ’ is absolutely true, or in other words θ is absolutely
appropriate to describe x. Similarly v(θ) = f means that ‘x is θ ’ is absolutely false (i.e., θ is absolutely inappropriate to
Y. Tang, J. Lawry / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (2012) 867–879 877
Table 1
Truth tables from Kleene’s strong three-valued logic [23].
¬ ∧ t b f ∨ t b f
t f t t b f t t t t
b b b b b f b t b b
f t f f f f f t b f
describe x), whilst v(θ) = b means that ‘x is θ ’ is a borderline case (i.e., θ is neither absolutely appropriate nor absolutely
inappropriate to describe x). 1
Theorem 8. For x ∈  and  ≥  ≥ 0, define v : LE → {t, f , b} such that ∀θ ∈ LE,
• v(θ) = t iff x ∈ N (,)θ
• v(θ) = f iff x ∈ (N (,)θ )c
• v(θ) = b iff x ∈ N (,)θ − N (,)θ
Then v is a Kleene valuation.
Proof. Follows immediately from Definition 3 and the Kleene truth tables. 
The semantic uncertainty of label expressions in LE also results in the uncertainty about the underlying Kleene valuation
for LE. Hence, it is possible to define the probabilities that ‘x is θ ’ is absolutely true and ‘x is θ ’ is not absolutely false,
respectively. Naturally, we have the following conclusion:
Corollary 8. For x ∈  and θ ∈ LE the following hold:
μ
θ
(x) = δ({(, ) : v(θ) = t})
μθ (x) = δ({(, ) : v(θ) = f })
Proof. Follows immediately from Definition 4 and Theorem 8. 
Thismeans that the lower appropriatenessμ
θ
(x) quantifies the belief that the statement ‘x is θ ’ is absolutely true, and the
upper appropriatenessμθ(x) quantifies the belief that the statement ‘x is θ ’ is not absolutely false. Moreover,μθ(x)−μθ(x)
quantifies the belief that the statement ‘x is θ ’ is a borderline case.
6. Interval and intuitionistic fuzzy sets
Intuitionistic fuzzy sets (IFS)were first proposed byAtanassov [25,26] as a bipolarmodel of fuzzy setswheremembership
and non-membership are considered separately. The basis of IFS are two measures τ and ν where, for x an element of the
underlying universe and θ a fuzzy description generated recursively from a set of basic fuzzy labels through application
of logical connectives ∧,∨ and ¬, τθ (x) corresponds to the membership degree of x in the extension of θ . 2 and νθ (x)
is the non-membership degree of x in the extension of θ . A duality relationship is then defined between τ and ν such
that, τ¬θ (x) = νθ (x) and ν¬θ (x) = τθ (x). It is also assumed that τθ (x) + νθ (x) ≤ 1. Furthermore, τ and ν are fully
truth-functional satisfying the following combination rules for∧ and∨: For any fuzzy descriptions θ and ϕ, and element x,
• τθ∧ϕ(x) = min(τθ (x), τϕ(x)), νθ∧ϕ(x) = max(νθ (x), νϕ(x))• τθ∨ϕ(x) = max(τθ (x), τϕ(x)), νθ∨ϕ(x) = min(νθ (x), νϕ(x))
As shown by Atanassov and Gargov [27] and discussed by Dubois et al. [28], there is an isomorphic relationship between
IFS and an older notion of interval fuzzy sets independently introduced by Zadeh [29], Grattan-Guiness [30], Jahn [31] and
Sambuc [32]. In this framework lower and upper membership degrees are defined, where μ
θ
(x) is the lower membership
degree of element x in the extension of θ , and μθ(x) is the upper membership degree of x in θ . These lower and upper
memberships then satisfy the following properties: For any element x and fuzzy descriptions θ and ϕ:
• μ
θ
(x) ≤ μθ(x)• μ¬θ (x) = 1 − μθ(x), and μ¬θ (x) = 1 − μθ(x)
1 Traditionally the middle truth-value b in Kleene three valued logic is interpreted as epistemic ignorance [24].
2 The extension of θ is the set of elements to which the description θ can be appropriately applied.
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• μ
θ∧ϕ(x) = min(μθ (x), μϕ(x)), μθ∧ϕ(x) = min(μθ (x), μϕ(x))• μ
θ∨ϕ(x) = max(μθ (x), μϕ(x)), μθ∨ϕ(x) = max(μθ (x), μϕ(x))
The mapping between interval fuzzy sets and IFS is then obtained by taking μ
θ
(x) = τθ (x) and μθ(x) = 1 − νθ (x). In the
following we identify a special case of the lower and upper appropriateness measures defined in Section 3, which satisfies
the above fully compositional combination rules for lower and upper membership functions in interval fuzzy set theory.
Consider the casewhere both  and  are functions of a single parameterα taking values in [0, 1]. The underlying intuition
is that α quantifies an agent’s overall level of imprecision in their definition of labels, so that as α increases the difference
between the upper extension of a label and its lower extension decreases. In effect this means that there exists an increasing
function f : [0, 1] → [0,∞) and a decreasing function f : [0, 1] → [0,∞) such that f ≤ f and for which  = f (α) and
 = f (α).
Definition 11 (Lower and upper threshold functions). f : [0, 1] → [0,∞) and f : [0, 1] → [0,∞) where f is an increasing
function and f is a decreasing function satisfying ∀α ∈ [0, 1] f (α) ≤ f (α).
Here, for notational simplicity, we will write Nαθ and N
α
θ as shorthand for N
(f (α)f (α))
θ and N
(f (α)f (α))
θ , respectively. We
then have the following Theorem [33].
Theorem 9. ∀α, α′ ∈ [0, 1] where α ≤ α′ it holds that ∀θ ∈ LE Nαθ ⊆ Nα
′
θ and N
α
θ ⊇ Nα
′
θ .
Corollary 9. ∀θ, ϕ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈ 
• μ
θ∧ϕ(x) = min(μθ (x), μϕ(x)), μθ∧ϕ(x) = min(μθ (x), μϕ(x))• μ
θ∨ϕ(x) = max(μθ (x), μϕ(x)), μθ∨ϕ(x) = max(μθ (x), μϕ(x))• μ¬θ (x) = 1 − μθ(x), μ¬θ (x) = 1 − μθ(x)
From Corollary 9 we can see that interval fuzzy sets, and consequently IFS, can be viewed as a special case of our bipolar
model inwhich the lowerandupper thresholdsarebothdetermineduniquelybyanoverall imprecisionparameterα ∈ [0, 1].
7. Conclusions
We have proposed a random set based model of vague concepts within the framework of prototype theory and which
allows for the explicit representation of borderline cases. This provides an integrated approach capturing aspects of typi-
cality, semantic uncertainty and indeterminism. Within this framework concept labels are represented by lower and upper
neighbourhoods of their prototypes, but where the neighbourhood boundaries are uncertain. Taking the single point cov-
erage functions of these nested random sets naturally generates lower and upper appropriateness measures where these
quantify the beliefs that a label expression in absolutely appropriate and not absolutely inappropriate to describe a given
instance, respectively. By focusing on the sets of appropriate labels which are either absolutely appropriate or not absolutely
inappropriate to describe a particular instance we can also obtain a mass function characterization of lower and upper
appropriateness measures, and which then provides a finite representational model. In addition, appropriateness measures
can be interpreted in terms of probability distributions on Kleene’s three-valued valuations so that the lower appropriate-
ness measure corresponds to the probability that the sentence ‘x is θ ’ is absolutely true, while the upper appropriateness
measure is the probability that ‘x is θ ’ is not absolutely false. Finally, it is shown that lower and uppermembership functions
in interval fuzzy set theory can be viewed as special cases of lower and upper appropriateness measures in which the lower
and upper thresholds are determined only as a function of a single imprecision parameter α ∈ [0, 1].
Futureworkwill include the application of the bipolarmodel to rule based systems and uncertain reasoning by extending
the ideas presented in [34,35]. The key point would be develop the learning method to determine the density function δ
associated with the label expressions from the data sets. Furthermore, we aim to investigate the use of lower and upper
appropriateness measures to model strong and weak assertions in multi-agent dialogues extending the work on language
games proposed in [36].
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